THE ETHICS OF THE SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY(Hindu Ethics)

In the course of our study of the Upanishads it was indicated that there were to be found in them various philosophical theories. This point was not elaborated, as it was said that the ethical outcome of the different doctrines was to all intents and purposes the same. . But in later times these theories came to be more sharply distinguished from each other, and the great orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy came to be recognized as such. There are many problems connected with their rise which we may pass over here. It is not necessary that we should study them in any detail at all as philosophical systems. But they have important bearings on ethical theory and practice, and it is desirable that from this point of view we should give them some attention. The ethical consequences of these systems have not been worked out as those of pAiropean systems have been, for there is a sense in which moral questions have but little interest or meaning for Indian philosophers. But any system of philosophy must have very important ethical bearings, and it is incumbent on us in a study of Hindu ethics to try to bring to light the peculiar relationships which exist between the great metaphysical conceptions of these systems and the conceptions which implicitly or explicitly have determined the lines of ethical thought.

 Six schools or darsanas are usually reckoned as 'orthodox’. They are the Purva Munamsa, the Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta, the Samkhya, the Yoga, the Vai^eshika, and the Nyaya. They are spoken of as orthodox because they are supposed to be in agreement with the teaching of the Vedas. This is to a large extent a fiction, for in many points all of them disagree with the Vedas and with each other. 1 here are, however, certain great doctrines in which all are agreed. Among the most notable of these are the doctrines of karma and samsdra^ and, ' theoretically, the supreme authority anddivine character of the Vedas. 

To the modern philosophical student it will seem strange that Purva Mlmdmsd is included among the philosophical systems. In it is set forth the karma 'kanda^ or * work portion ’ of the Veda. It expounds the details of Vedic dka^miaj the rewards that are attached to various works. These are in the main not ethical works, but the sacrificial works and other ritual observances of the Brahmanas, reduced to some kind of a system. It is indeed hardly an independent system of philosophy, even in the Indian sense of the term, for it really serves as an introduction to the Vedanta, as the name itself indicates—the earlier Mimamsa, in relation to the Uttara or later Mimarhsa. Deussen says that it is related to the Vedanta much in the same way as the Old Testament is related to the New Testament. But just as the New Testa* nient supersedes the Old Testament, so does the Vedanta, the jndna kdnda^ or part of knowledge, supersede the Purva Mimarhsa, the karma kdnda^ or part of works. It is taught, nevertheless, in the Purva Mimarhsa, that salvation can be attained through the right performance of these works, when they are performed without thought of reward.

One question which has a distinct ethical significance has been raised in connexion with the Purva Mimarhsa. It is the question whether it is or is not atheistic. The charge of atheism finds justification in a remark made by Badarayana, the author of the Vedanta Sut7'as, where he expounds the peculiar teaching of Jaimini, the author of the Sutras of the Purva Mimarhsa, regarding the operation of karma. He held that God would be guilty of cruelty and partiality if He rewarded and punished men according to their works, and that works produce their own result ; ‘ in other words, that for the moral government of the world no Lord is wanted This is a point of view which certainly reveals an appreciation of one of the difficulties of the doctrine of karma. The greatest and most characteristic system of Indian Philosophy is the Vedanta, Its greatest exponent was Sahkaracharya, a thinker who w^’as born in South India in the end of the eighth century A.D., living probably till about A.D. 850. His doctrines are expounded in his Commentary on the Vedanta S?ltras of Badarayana, the date of which is doubtful. Sahkaracharya is recognized as the greatest philosophical thinker whom India has produced, and there has certainly been none who has left a deeper influence on Indian thought. 

The central doctrine of the Vedanta may be enunciated very briefly. It is expressed in the Chhdndogya Upanishad (vi. 8) in the words spoken to Svetaketu by his father, ‘ Tat tvam asi ^ Thou art that In these words there is taught the identity of the soul with Brahman. The individual soul falsely imagines that it exists independently, and that other beings have similar independent existence. The ignorance, avidyd, which accounts for this, is the root of all evil The soul through ignorance is misunderstood, and instead of being known as it is, it is identified with its npadhis^ or limitations. It is in this way that the illusion of the empirical self comes to be—the illusion of the self as limited in various ways. The self thinks of itself as agent and enjoyer, and it is this illusory self, alike deceiving and deceived, that is the subject of samsdra. The Vedanta seeks to show how through true knowledge, vidya^ the soul is to be delivered from its bondage to shadows, and led into freedom. It is not through becoming something which now it is not, but by realizing what it is : the self is Brahman. 

^ Max Miiiler, Six Systems^ p. 211.

The doctrine thus briefly outlined is expounded and elaborated in great detail. It is possible here to deal with only the most significant conceptions, and of these only with such as will help to make clear the ethical tendencies of the system.Let it be noted once more that there are certain principles which are common to all orthodox Hindu thought, that are taken for granted. It is assumed that the doctrines of karma and samsdra are valid, and that existence under conditions in which they apply, in other words empirical existence, is essentially evil. This is taken for granted, and the question is as to a way of escape from this evil state. The answer of the Vedanta involves a special theory of the nature of the Universe and of the Soul.

It is important to observe that the Vedanta does not maintain that the Universe as it presents itself to the ordinary mind is simply illusion. It is sometimes represented as if it did so, but the case is not so simple. The validity of the judgements which we continually pass on events taking place around us is not denied. It is true that the phenomenal world is the outcome of ameij’d, but it has a certain relative reality. It is real for him who has not attained to the knowledge of Brahman. Thus Sankara says : ^ The entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true so long as the knowledge of Brahman and the Self of all has not arisen, just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes The same is true of popular beliefs and exercises. They are not meaningless or valueless. The wor shipper of Brahman as personal really worships God, and he who speaks of Brahman as creator of the world speaks what is true. The whole Vedic system of religion is sound. But in all this the individual is at the stage ofapard vidyd^ or lower knowledge, not para vidyd, or higher knowledge. The former provides a religious philosophy, relatively true, for those who have not attained the higher knowledge. But from the point of view of para vidyd all this is false. The phenomenal world is unreal, the worship of a personal God invalid, and the idea of the creation of the Universe a myth.

^ Quoted by Max Muller, Six Systons of Indian Philosophy^ p. 154.

 All is Brahman, and Brahman is all. The application of predicates to him is illegitimate, for all predicates, even that of existence, are inadequate. He is misrepresented when in any way duality is ascribed to him. In this sense the world is mdyd, illusion, and the apard vidyd is false. Ignorance, avidyd, accounts for the illusion. But whence does it come ? In some sense Brahman is the cause of it, as the magician is of the illusion which he projects. But this is only a figure. It is an answer to a question that will not arise for him who has attained to the knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman. The white radiance of Reality is unstained, undifferentiated.

What then of the Self, which we are told is Brahman ? This brings us to the peculiar psychology of the Vedanta. As has been said, the doctrines of karma and savisard are unquestioningly held. The soul passes through death to re-birth, determined in its course by the karma which it has made.But the soul which migrates is the soul as obscured by avidyd. To this ignorance it owes the ttpddhis^ limitations, which belong to it as a phenomenal existence. It is difficult to find an English equivalent for this word. The term ‘faculties’ perhaps is the nearest equivalent, but even it is inadequate and misleading. These npadhis are (i) the MukhyaprdJia^ the vital spirit, the principle of the unconscious, vegetative life, presiding over the other organs of life ; (ix) the Manas^ the organ of understanding and volition, which presides over (3) the Indriyas^ the "organs of perception and action. These together constitute the Sukshma Sarlra^ the subtle body, invisible, but material. The subtle body is distinguished from the StJnda Sarira^ the gross body, which with death is decomposed, while the subtle body finds a home in another gross body. The subtle body does not change, but it is accompanied by (4) moral determination, the treasure of karma which it has acquired. By this the next form of existence is determined. Now, in all this we have nothing that belongs to the Soul in its real nature. In common thought the Soul is so represented as the outcome of ignorance. But ignorance does not simply misrepresent the Atman. The phenomenal soul is more than the merely passing product of a freak of the imagination from which one may turn at any time. Like the external world, it has a coherence and orderliness that prevent it from being so lightly set aside. To him who has not attained to the highest knowledge it is real. 

We need not here enter into any account of the course that the soul with its itpddhis takes after death— along the way of the fathers, or of the gods, or being debarred from either, according to its works and knowledge. Nor need we enter into any of the other psychological-eschatological questions connected with the state of the soul after the death of the body. Suffice it to say that the round of sainsdra remains for all except those who have attained the higher knowledge. He who has attained to the knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman, which involves the distinction of the self from its tipddhis and consequently its freedom from them, has thereby attained Moksha^ or freedom. This is a freedom for which one has not to wait till after death, but it may be possessed even in this life. 

Max Muller has drawn attention to a discussion which has been long carried on, as to whether virtue is essential for the attainment of Moksha} The question is perhaps hardly a relevant one. For, as has been pointed out in Book II, Chapter I, it is not quite just to interpret the knowledge which brings freedom as if it were of the nature of a purely intellectual intuition. If it were, then every one who yielded intellectual assent to the central propositions of the Vedanta, would thereby have freedom. The knowledge that is meant is more than that, involving activity of the will as well as of the intellect. Yet it is liable to misunderstanding, just as the Christian conception of faith is. And the result is that we have contradictory answers given to the question whether virtue is or is not necessary.

^ Six Systems of Indian Philosophy^ p. i66.

There seems to be no real difficulty about the relation of good works to Moksha in the teaching of Sankara. There can be no doubt that they help a man on to the stage at which deliverance becomes possible. And they do this in two ways, by their meritoriousness leading to re-birth in more favourable forms of being, and by their moral discipline helping the soul to freedom from the tyranny of the senses. It is in the second way that the operation of good works is of greatest importance, for meri-^ torious works are of many kinds and most of them are devoid of strictly ethical character ; and in any case it is held that the attainment of knowledge cannot be guaranteed by the performance of meritorious works, Speaking of the value of works as a means to knowledge, Deussen says of both the ‘ outward’ means to knowledge (Vedic study, sacrifice, alms, penance, fasting) and the ‘ closer ’ means (tranquillity^ self-restraint, renunciation, patience, concentration) that they do not, strictly speaking, produce knowledge as their fruit. ' These works are only , auxiliaries to the attainment of knowledge, inasmuch as the man who leads a lifeof holy works is not overpowered by affections such as Passion, &c. According to this their rdle in the scheme of salvation would be not so much meritorious as ascetic.’^ But in all this it is important to remember that when Moksha has been attained a stage has been reached at which morality has no longer any meaning ; the ethical is transcended. 

The distinction which has been drawn above between the meritorious and ascetic aspects of works is one which deserves somewhat closer attention. All works alike have merit or demerit in themselves, in addition to any influence they may have of an ascetic character, and so they contribute to the shaping of the ‘ moral determination ' which accompanies the subtle body. This is a fact pointing to a difficulty which obtrudes itself in many places in our account of Hindu ethics. The difficulty is connected with the dualism existing between what in later thought have been called noumena and pheno mena. Let us look at the case in this way. 

^ Deussen, System of the Vedmta^ p. 411 f.

It is taught that all works bear their appropriate fruit. But then there is undoubtedly truth in the distinction that has been drawn between the meritorious and ascetic aspects of works, and this distinction has far-reaching consequences, though here we must beware of exaggeration. Those works which arc described as ascetic are also meritorious, bearing their proper fruit in future lives. But the difficulty lies in this, that not all meritorious works contribute directly, at any rate, to the production of that condition of mind in which the attainment of Moksha becomes possible. Good deeds as well as evil deeds bind man to the chain of samsdra, for the fruit of all works alike has to be consumed. We see from this how ill the traditional morality has been related to fundamental philosophical conceptions. The system of dharmay with all its unethical admixtures, has been uncritically accepted. But alongside the strange medley of practices which constitute dharma there are those spiritual qualities and activities, which owe the value that is attributed to them to the relation in which they stand to the goal of all being. We have thus in a certain sense a double ethical standard. This was perhaps almost inevitable, for only an other-worldly and anti-social ethic could have been deduced from the ideal which the Vedanta presents. But it is nevertheless unsatisfactory that recognition should be given to a system of dharma which stands in no intelligible relation to the goal of all attainment. This is a difficulty that cannot be got over by the argument that through the observance of dharma a man is helped on towards the stage at which it becomes possible for him to attain saving knowledge. It is true that the system of dharma does provide a way of life, at the end of which a man enters upon a mode of existence conducive to the attainment of the apprehension of the oneness of the self and Brahman. But the great mass of the details of dharma still remains unexplained. They certainly stand upon a different footing from the qualifications which are laid down by Sankara as necessary for him who would study the Vedanta, viz. study of the Veda, and the Four Requirements, (i) discerning between eternal and non-eternal substance, (2) renunciation of the enjoyment of reward here and in the other world, (3) the attainment of the six means—tranquillity, restraint, renunciation, resignation, concentration, belief, (4) the longing for liberation.^ Apart from the implications of the principle that the study of the Veda is a necessary clement in the preparation of the student of the Vedanta, we have here a set ofprinciples partly ethical in character. But such teaching serves to bring into clearer light the meaninglessness of the great mass of the details of dharma. 

 The difficulty may be put more palpably if we try to show how the double standard touches practical life. And here it cannot be denied that the Christian ethic is much more consistent. On most interpretations of the Christian ethic, the ideal man is one who, while having his 'citizenship in heaven', enters with the greatest zest into the social life of the world, not being conformed to it, but seeking to transform it in accordance with the heavenly pattern. According to the Vedanta, the ideal is expressed, not in the perfect fulfilment even of what are admitted to be one's social duties, but ultimately in the negation of them. Our objection to this attitude to the common life of man in the world is not that it does not promise salvation as a reward for the fulfilment of one*s worldly duties, for in this it agrees with Christianity, but that the realized ideal is not expressed in the richest social life. There is thus lacking to dharma ih?it inspiration which is necessary to the living of the best ethical life. Obedience to it is in no way an expression of man^s true being. It stands largely through the promise which it holds out to the mass of men of a second best as the reward of its observance. So the Vedanta has serious limitations on its practical side, the side of it with which we are here concerned. Max Muller has clearly apprehended this weakness in it, as is seen in the following passage:

I quite admit that, as a popular philosophy, the Vedanta would have ^ Deussen, The Systein of the Vedanta^ pp. 77 ff. 

its dangers, that it would fail to call out and strengthen the manly qualities required for the practical side of life,

and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which the most essential virtues of

 social and political life might dwindle away into mere phantoms.^

We turn from the Advaitist (monistic) philosophy of the Vedanta to the Dvaitist (diialistic) philosophy of the Samkhya. Samkhya ideas are prominent in some of the Upanishads, particularly in the Katha^ Svetasvatara^ Prama, ^ixid Maitrd yani. The Mahdhhdrata contains in parts a great deal of Samkhya thought. We have seen that the Bhagavadgita has a form of the Sarhkhya as its philosophical basis, but other parts of the Mahdhhdrata also contain Sarhkhyan ideas. The classical expression of the Samkhya philosophy is found in the Sdvikhya Kdrikd, a work which belongs probably to the first half of the fourth century A. D. 

The Sarhkhya starts from the assumption of the validity of the doctrine of karma and saihsdra^ and of the essential misery of the world. This misery, it is held, is threefold. There is that which’ is due to ourselves, that which is due to others, and that which is due to fate. The Sarhkhya professes to show a way of deliverance from this misery, through knowledge. The ontology of the system is thoroughly dualistic. The phenomenal universe owes its being, or its being consciously experienced, to the coming together of two principles, Purnsha^ ‘ Soul ^ and Prakriti^ ‘ nature k Prakriti is also designated Pradhd% chief one, and Avyakta^ unevolved. It has three originally conceived as constituents of Prakriti^ later as qualities or moods, Sativa or goodness, Rajas^ or passion, and TamaSy or darkness. It is through the activity of these moods that the unevolved develops itself. Through their activity the phenomenal universe, or the universe regarded as a possible object of knowledge, takes shape. But Prakriti by itself is unconscious. Conscious experience arises only when it is illuminated by Purusha.

^ Six Systemsy p. 192 f.

 It is the subject for which Prakriti is the object. Piirrisha is described in terms not essentially different from those in which Brahman is described. The main difference between them, besides the fact that Prakriti is given an existence independent of it, is that P^misha is described as not one but many. This may seem to be no slight difference, and in truth it is not. But the practical implications of its manifoldness are not great, and the question whether it was many or one was even ! a subject of discussion among early thinkers. As contrasted j with Prakriti, Purnsha is inactive. These two are thought j of as absolutely different from each other ; yet it is through i their union that the empiric self arises. The union has been compared to that of a lame man with a blind man on whose shoulders he is borne. Purnsha remains in the bliss of isolation till its union with Prakritihx'mg^ it into the experience of a world of objects.

Prakriti differentiates itself under the influence of Purnsha. From Prakriti first is derived B^tddhi, intelligence or understanding. From it is derived Ahavikdra, or individuation. From it again are derived Manas, or mind, the five bnddhlnd^ riyaSy or organs of perception, the five karmendriyas, or organs j of action, and the five tajimdtraSy or fine elements. From these last, again, are derived the five mahabhutas, or gross elements; which constitute the material universe. This brief statement by itself will not be particularly intelligible, and a few words may well be said in explanation ; but even with much explanation the difficulty remains that we are dealing with terms to which there are no equivalents in English, and with conceptions some of which have nothing corresponding to them in Western thought ; and there is the added difficulty that there seems to be considerable ambiguity in the use of the terms in Saihkhya writings. In the Kdrikd, according to Professor Keith, Buddhi ' is defined as the power of decision, by which it seems to be distinguished from the mind, Manas, as the power which formulates the possible courses and carries out the decision, while on the intellectual side mind brings up the material for concepts which the intellect formulates'.^ But besides this psychological interpretation, Intddhi and manas have also a cosmical significance to which but little attention is given in the Kdrikd. Ahavikm^a^ the principle of individuation, is the principle in virtue of which the belief in an * I which is the subject of experiences, arises. The five BitddhlndriyasA^t ear, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, and the nose, and the five Karmendriyas^ voice, hands, feet, the organ of excretion, and the organ of generation, are, along with Manas, derived from Ahanikdra in its Sa/fva form, with the aid of Rajas. Similarly from it in its Tamas form are derived the five Tanmdtras, the essences of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. These essences have no difference in them, but the}^ give rise to the Mahdhhutas, or gross elements, earth, water, light, air, and ether, each of which is possessed of qualities, and each 'of which stands in a which is possessed of qualities, and each 'of which stands in a special relation to one of the five sence.

Every living being possesses a lihga deha or lihga iarlra, a subtle body, which migrates from one gross body to another in successive births. It is composed of Bnddhi Ahamkdra^ Manas, the organs of sense and action, the fine elements, and the subtle parts of the gross elements. It is this subtle body, incorporeal in character, which receives the impressions made by deeds performed in the course of its various migrations, and by these it is determined as to the form of each new embodiment. Further it is the union of the spirit with this subtle body which is the cause of all misery, and ^ salvation ’ is attained only through the breaking of the union, a consummation dependent in the Samkhya, as in the Vedanta, on knowledge ; but in this case the knowledge is not of the identity of the Self with Brahman, but of the distinction between Ptnmsha and Prakriti. When this knowledge has been attained, the illusory union which existed between them is brokenned; Prakriti withdraws itself from Pnrusha, the latter having realized the falsit}^ of the attribution of the adventures of Prakriti to itself. Purusha now remains in eternal isolation, and Prakriti relapses into inactivity.

^ Keith, SaihJdiya System^ p, 79.

It is evident that in the Sarhkhya as in the Vedanta, moral predicates do not apply to the state of him who has attained Moksha. With release from individuality, they no longer have any meaning. But this does not mean that morality has no significance at all For to man in his unenlightened state moral distinctions have real value. The principles of karma and transmigration operate with absolute inflexibility. Every deed leads to its appropriate result, and the merit or demerit that one acquires brings one nearer to, or takes one farther from, a position at which final liberation becomes possible of attainment. But in this respect the teaching of the Sarhkhya is not different from that of the Vedanta.

There is another aspect of Sarhkhya ethical teaching which is more distinctive, though rather in the particular form in which it is expressed than in the practical outcome of it. In certain ways the value of virtues of an ascetic kind is emphasized. The Gnnas are interpreted in one aspect in an ethical way. There are three different kinds of action springing from them. Sattva is the occasion of good conduct, which consists in kindness, control, and restraint of the organs, freedom from hatred, reflection, displaying of supernatural powers. Rajas leads to indifferent conduct, which consists in passion, anger, greed, fault-finding, violence, discontent, rudeness, shown by change of countenance. Tainas occasions bad conduct, which consists in madness, intoxication, lassitude, nihilism, devotion to women, drowsiness, sloth, worthlessness, impurity.^ All these actions, good and bad alike, are transcended when liberation is won, but the actions of the Sattva Guna are those which carry one on towards the point of attainment. It is when the Sattva mood is dominant that it becomes possible for the Buddhi to apprehend clearly its own nature as belonging to Prakriti, and to discriminate Prakriti from Purusha.

^ Max Muller, 6'ix Systems, p. 355.

The Vo£-a must be treated along with the Sarhkhya, to which it is closely related. Indeed it is hardly entitled to be called a distinct system of philosophy, for in the strictly theoretical part of it it follows the Sarhkhya with but slight deviations. The classical expression of the Yoga is the Yogasutra of Patahjali, a writer who, until recent times, was generally identified with the grammarian of the same name, who flourished in the second century B.C. It has now been established that they were two distinct persons, and the author of the Sutras undoubtedly lived at a date several centuries later, though his precise period is still uncertain. The Yoga, as a philosophy, follows the Sarhkhya in all important details, as has been already said. The only important difference is that while the Sarhkhya is * atheistic the Yoga recognizes an Isvara, or Lord. This may be a rather loose form ofstatenient, for the Sarhkhya does not deny the existence of gods ; it fails only to find any place for a Supreme Being. In the Yoga system, on the. other hand, Isvara has a very definite and essential place. The accounts that are given of him are by no means consistent. It is clear that he is not thought of as in any way transcending the Sarhkhyan dualism of Pumsha and Prakriti. He is a particular soul. As Patanjali himself puts it:

Isvara, the Lord, is a Purusha (Self) that has never been touched by- sufferings, actions, rew-ards, or consequent dispositions.^

In him the Sattva Guna shines eternally undimmed. The primacy that he possesses among Pitrushas is not something that he has attained, for he stands above all limitations which belong to them. More than that, it is in some sense through his will that the union of Purnsha and Prakriti takes place, in other words, that the phenomenal world comes into being. And, what is equally important, he is gracious in his attitude towards men. Madhavahas put the case well in the following words:

This school accepts the old twenty-five principles (of the Sarhkhya), ‘ Nature/ &c. : only adding the Supreme Being as the twenty-sixth—

a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will  assumed a body in order to create,

and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,  and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence.^

i. 24. Quoted by Max Muller, Six Systems^ p. 320.

It is important to bear in mind the fact that the Lord of the Yoga occupies a place that is by no means central in the system. It is essentially a practical system, and the importance of Isvara lies in the function which he fulfils of helping in their progress towards liberation those who are devoted to him. The predominantly practical purpose of the Yoga is indicated by its very name. It is derived from the root yuj^meaning to yoke, and the sense in which it was originally used was probably that of yoking one's self or undertaking exercise with a view to the attainment of an end. The Yogasutra^ accordingly, supplies us with practical directions intended to help the soul towards the attainment of the end laid down by the Sarhkhya. Some thinkers have misconceived its purpose, and in this they have been misled partly by a false interpretation of the term ‘Yoga’. They have taken the root idea to be that of joining. Even Barth fell into this error, when he spoke of Yoga as ‘ the state ofunion Such an interpretation involves the putt